The welfare caseload evolves through a process of flows onto and off of welfare that can be described with a Markov Chain model. Using formal results for Markov models, this paper examines the dynamic properties of the welfare caseload. In particular, we examine steady states, the speed of convergence, and the relative importance of entry and exit for changes in the caseload. Implementing these models with administrative data for California, we find that the welfare caseload has considerable momentum and that adjustments are far from instantaneous. In addition, we find that changes in the entry rate are empirically more important than changes in the exit rate for explaining changes in the overall caseload. These findings have several implications for the conventional methods that are used to study the changing caseload. D
Introduction
Researchers and policy makers have been very interested in why the United States welfare caseload changes, where welfare refers to the federal program that provides cash aid assistance to the poor. This program was previously called the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, but it was substantially changed in 1996 and renamed the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
0927-5371/$ -see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2004.01.006 This interest has led to numerous academic studies that can be classified into three groups. One group of studies has examined changes in the aggregate caseload level to make inferences about the source of these changes, while a second group of studies examined individual flows on and off the caseload to make similar inferences.
1 A third group of studies has combined the two approaches by examining individual flows on and off the caseload and then inferring the impact on the caseload level with a standard Markov Chain framework.
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This paper extends the third group of studies by exploiting mathematical results on Markov Chain models to characterize more generally the dynamic properties of the welfare caseload. By caseload dynamics, we are referring to the process of how contemporaneous changes impact the caseload over time. The mathematical results we exploit include characterizations of a steady state and the speed of convergence to the steady state.
Using administrative data for the California welfare caseload, our analysis yields four findings. First, we find that the welfare caseload contains considerable momentum. For example, if the conditions in 1993 had persisted indefinitely, the caseload would have continued to increase much more, and if the conditions in 1999 had persisted indefinitely, the caseload would have continued to decrease much more. Second, a related result implies that the caseload converges to its steady state relatively sluggishly. When the system is out of its steady state, we find that the bhalf-lifeQ in convergence is approximately 2 years-half of the gap between the initial caseload and the steady state caseload is closed in 2 years and three-quarters of the gap in 4 years. Third, our estimates of the dynamic properties are very sensitive to the specification of the state-space. Inferences from the simple two-state models that have been previously used differ dramatically when compared to inferences from richer and more realistic models. Finally, much of the caseload change during the 1990s was due to changes in the new entry rate; changes in the continuation rate and the re-entry rate were less important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the basic relevant properties of Markov Chain models. In the third section, we discuss our data and develop three tractable models of the welfare caseload. In the fourth section, we examine the implied steady state of these models to understand the underlying momentum in the welfare caseload. The fifth section examines the speed at which the caseload converges towards its steady state. The sixth section considers the relative role of entry, continuation, and re-entry. We summarize the findings and discuss their implications for welfare policy and welfare policy research in the final section.
1 Moffitt (1992) reviews both types of studies. More recent examples of the first type include CEA (1997, 1999) , Levine and Whitmore (1998) , Wallace and Blank (1999) , Figlio and Ziliak (1999) , Moffitt (1999) , Ziliak et al. (2000) , Schoeni and Blank (2001) , Blank (2001) , and Grogger (in press ). More recent examples of the second type include Bane and Ellwood (1994) , Blank and Ruggles (1996) , Hoynes (2000) , Mueser et al. (2000) , Gittleman (2001) , Ribar (2004) , and Grogger (2002) . 2 For example, see Boskin and Nold (1975) , Hutchens (1981) , Gittleman (2001) , Mueser et al. (2000) , and Klerman and Haider (in press ).
A dynamic model of the welfare caseload

A Markov Chain representation of the welfare caseload
Generically, a Markov Chain model describes how individuals transit between various bstates.Q Such a model can be represented as
where S(t) is a vector that contains the share of individuals in each of Q states and M(t) is the transition matrix between the states, both in period t. Because the transition matrix M is allowed to be time varying, Eq. (1) is simply an accounting identity describing how the system changes over time. A Markov Chain model can be used to examine how the caseload changes over time by simulating a bcounterfactualQ caseload path. For example, we could simulate what would happen if the current entry and continuation rates were to persist. Similarly, we could simulate what would happen if the entry rate were cut in half, perhaps due to the passage of more stringent welfare laws. Such simulations follow directly from the recursive structure of Eq. (1).
As a simple example, suppose individuals were considered to be in one of two states in a given period, either receiving welfare or not receiving welfare. Formally, let s(r,t) denote the share of the population that are (r)ecipients and s(r,t) denote the share of the population that are non-recipients (n). We can then represent the welfare caseload with the two-state model, " s r; t ð Þ
where e(t) is the probability that an individual not on welfare enters aid and c(t) is the probability that a person on welfare continues on aid (i.e., one minus the conventional exit rate), all in time t. Because the sum of the share of recipients and non-recipients must be 1 (s(n,t) + s(r,t) = 1), we can represent Eq. (2) more compactly as,
where s(t) is the share of the population receiving aid, i.e., the same as s(r,t). The simple divergence of the entry and continuation rates is sufficient to make the welfare caseload a dynamic process. Denoting the change in an arbitrary variable v as Dv(t) = v(t) À v(t À 1), the change in the caseload can be rewritten as,
This expression decomposes the change in the welfare caseload into three components:
(1) contemporaneous changes in the continuation rate, (2) contemporaneous changes in the entry rate, and (3) past changes in the caseload level. Thus, a one-time policy change that affects the entry rate today would cause a change in this period's caseload (because of the second term) and in next period's caseload (because of the last term). Moreover, the lagged effects would disappear if the entry and continuation rates were equal because the first two terms would collapse to be the common flow rate and the last term would be 0. It is straightforward to extend the two-state model to allow for more realistic processes. One useful extension is to allow the continuation rate to vary with time on aid. This pattern in the data has been noted by many previous authors and is often referred to as bduration dependence.Q This empirical regularity can be incorporated by expanding the state-space to distinguish individuals by length of time on aid. In other words, individuals who have been on aid for two periods are considered to be in a different state than those who have been on aid for three periods, and thus their continuation probabilities could differ. The model similarly can be extended to allow entry onto welfare to differ for those who have recently left welfare, as well as differ with the length of time since an individual leaves welfare. We consider such models below.
Properties of Markov Chain models
Markov Chain models have been studied extensively, and we can rely on very general theorems to describe how the caseload would evolve. Consider the following theorem for an arbitrary Q-state Markov matrix that is directly applicable to the transition matrix M.
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Theorem 1. Let P be an irreducible, aperiodic, and non-negative Markov matrix (Cinlar, 1975, p. 378) . Then, (a) There exists a steady state p for the system where, for any initial vector x 0 , p = lim tYl P t x 0 and all elements of p are strictly positive. (b) The vector p is the unique solution of Pp = p and 1p = p; in other words, the vector p is the eigenvector of the matrix P associated with the eigenvalue 1, normalized so that the elements sum to 1. (c) The convergence in (a) is geometric: there exists constants a N 0 and 1
. ., for all i, j. Here b can be taken to be the largest number amongst the absolute values of the eigenvalues of P excluding the eigenvalue 1.
The matrix M is non-negative because it contains transition probabilities, aperiodic because individuals from any starting state have a positive probability of transiting through every other state, and irreducible because the path to visit other states is not fixed.
To elucidate the content of this theorem, we develop these ideas explicitly for the twostate model. The steady state can be computed directly by solving for the fixed point s*-the value such that s(t) = s(t À 1)-for Eq. (3),
This expression demonstrates part (a) of the theorem: the steady state is a function only of the transition rates and not of the initial share on aid. The general method for analyzing Markov Chain models follows from decomposing the Markov matrix into its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. For the two-state case, Eq. (2) can be re-written as " s r; t ð Þ
where k 1 and k 2 are the eigenvalues of M, ½ w 11 w 12 and ½ w 21 w 22 are the eigenvectors of M, and i 1 and i 2 are constants which are determined by the initial state of the system. Under the assumptions of the theorem, the largest eigenvalue of the system (call it k 1 ) equals 1 and the other eigenvalue (call it k 2 ) is strictly less than 1 in absolute value.
The rest of the theorem follows from the representation in Eq. (6). First, as t becomes large, the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (6) vanishes because k 2 is strictly less than 1 in absolute value, while the first term remains constant because k 1 is equal to 1. Thus, the first eigenvector gives the steady state of the system as t becomes arbitrarily large. Second, the system converges to this steady state at a speed governed by the second eigenvalue raised to the tth power, and thus the rate of convergence to the steady state is geometric.
Implementing the models with California data
In this section, we first briefly discuss our data; see Haider et al. (1999) and Klerman and Haider (in press) for more detail. We then describe the three specific nested versions of a Markov Chain model of the welfare caseload that we analyze in the balance of the paper.
MEDS data
Because our model specification is influenced by the available data, we begin by briefly describing our data. Our empirical work uses individual-level administrative data for California from the Medi-Cal Eligibility Determination System (MEDS). The MEDS provides a monthly roster of all welfare participants in California from 1987 to 1999.
We construct an analysis file by drawing a random sample of approximately 3% of the MEDS, stratified so that we obtain approximately an equal number of observations in each of California's counties. This scheme results in an analysis file that contains 282,381 people and 10,966,420 person-months during the interval 1989 to 1999.
We cannot construct entry rates onto welfare directly from the MEDS because the MEDS is a random sample of individuals receiving welfare. To estimate entry, we additionally rely on the Intercensal Population estimates generated by the United States Census Bureau. These data provide estimates of the annual population by age group and by county; we use simple linear interpolation to estimate monthly population. Combining these data allows us to estimate the population at risk and the subsequent entry rate. The population at risk is defined as all individuals under the age of 50. There is a notable seasonable component to California's welfare caseload, which is not surprising given the state's large agricultural sector. As a rough correction for this seasonality, we compute average monthly flow rates and participation rates over a calendar year and base our analysis on the annual averages. This strategy allows us to focus more clearly on underlying secular changes in the data. Although the equation of motion (Eq. (3)) does not strictly apply to these average flow rates, empirically the data still fit together quite well. For example, Fig. 2 presents the monthly caseload computed from the annual averages of the monthly flow rates (and the caseload level in the initial period) and the actual monthly caseload. As can be observed, the simulated caseload tracks the actual caseload quite well. However, comparisons of the average flow rates and the average caseload should be made with caution.
Specifying the Markov models
We consider three nested versions of a Markov Chain model. The first specification is the two-state model described above. Similar models were used in previous papers that examined the welfare caseload (e.g., Boskin and Nold, 1975; Hutchens, 1981; Mueser et al., 2000; Gittleman, 2001) . The second specification allows the continuation rate to vary with time on aid. As others have found, the continuation rate in our data varies with time on aid, initially declining and then increasing steadily approximately for 20 months (see Fig. 3 , Panel A). The third model further extends the second model to allow the probability of initially entering welfare to differ from re-entering welfare and to vary with time since last receiving aid. Again, this extension is consistent with previous research and our data. In the MEDS, recent welfare leavers have a probability of returning to welfare well above that of the general population and the probability declines with time off of welfare (see Fig. 3, Panel B) .
For the latter two models, the structure of our data induces an initial conditions problem. The MEDS includes information only on recipients' current welfare status, so we do not know how long welfare recipients have been on aid or if non-recipients were previously on aid in the initial period (month) of our data. Therefore, we cannot assign recipients to their true state in the earliest part of the sample period. We address this problem by assuming that the continuation rate is constant after a given number of months and that the process of reentry and new entry is identical after a given number of months. With these assumptions and dropping sufficient initial months of data, we can place individuals into their proper state.
As an example of this structure, consider the case where the continuation rate is constant after three periods and re-entrants are identical to entrants after three periods. Then, the third model (i.e., allowing for duration dependence in entry and re-entry) can be described with the Markov Chain model, 
2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 where c(k) is the continuation rate for individuals who have been on aid for k periods, b(l) is the re-entry rate for individuals who have been off aid for l periods, s(r,k,t) is the share of the population who have received aid for k consecutive periods, s(o,l,t) is the share of the population who have who have been off aid for l consecutive periods, and s(n,t) is the share of the population that has not been on aid for at least three periods. 5 The structure of the transition matrix places individuals who have been on welfare for three (or more) periods in the same state as those individuals who are beginning their third period on aid (s(r,3,t)). Similarly, individuals who have been off of welfare for three (or more) periods are placed in the same state as those individuals who have not ever been on aid (s(n,t)). For this specification, we can place everyone in the appropriate state after dropping the first three periods of data.
To empirically implement the second model, we assume that the continuation rate is constant after 24 months. Thus, the second model is comprised of 25 states: being on welfare for 1 month, on for 2 months,. . ., on for 23 months, on for 24 or more months, and off welfare. The third model additionally allows for the re-entry rate to vary for 24 months and thus contains 49 states: being off welfare for 1 month, off for 2 months,. . ., off for 24 months, and the same 25 states in the second model; individuals who have been off for 25 months or more are assumed to face the same re-entry rate as those who have never been on aid. These assumptions are consistent with the underlying data (see Fig. 3) . 6 In the discussion that follows, we refer to these models as the 2-, 25-, and 49-state models, respectively.
The steady state of the caseload
We first exploit the fact that Markov Chain models have well-defined steady states to compute what the caseload would be if the flow rates of a particular period were to continue indefinitely. If the steady state were much different than the actual caseload in a particular period, we will consider there to be much momentum remaining in the system. Table 1 presents the underlying flow rates, the actual share on aid, and the steady state caseload implied by the two-state model (based on Eq. (5)). For 1999, the average monthly entry rate was 0.0019, the average monthly continuation rate was 0.9592, and the average monthly share on aid was 0.0689. These flow rates imply a steady state in which 4.5% of the population is on aid. Comparing this steady state to the actual share on aid of 6.9%, the two-state model implies that the caseload would decrease to a level 34% below its 1999 level if the 1999 entry and continuation rates were to persist indefinitely. Similar calculations for the peak of the 5 We suppress the dependence of the flow rates on the time period for compactness of notation. 6 Haider et al. (2003) examine the sensitivity of making these assumptions. 7 These calculations are not intended to be forecasts of what the caseload would actually be in future years. Such forecasts would more usefully be done by forecasting flow rates into the future based on covariates and then simulating period by period changes. steady state caseload in 1993 suggest that the caseload had the potential of increasing another 18% (from 0.1035 to 0.1224). Such calculations suggest that much momentum can remain in the caseload at any particular time.
Although these calculations follow immediately from standard results for Markov Chain models, it is useful to provide a heuristic description of how these processes work. Consider a one-time change that lowers the entry rate, perhaps due to a change in policy or the economy. The full impact of this change in the entry rate on the caseload will not be observed instantaneously. Instead, the full impact on the caseload will only occur over time as the smaller cohorts entering under the new regime replace the larger cohorts that entered under the old regime. Such a process will cause the caseload to continue to fall in the future, without further changes to the entry rate. However, these caseload declines will not continue indefinitely. The larger cohorts that entered under the old regime will eventually be replaced completely by the new, smaller cohorts. When this occurs, the caseload will achieve its new long-run level. This new long-run level is the steady state reported in Table 1 .
Another implication of Table 1 is that there need not be a simple relationship between changes in the flows and changes in the stocks. For example, if the flow rates of 1999 were to continue unchanged into 2000, the caseload would fall in 2000. A more dramatic example can be observed between 1994 and 1995. Between these 2 years, both of the flow rates declined but the caseload increased. The Markov Chain model provides a clear interpretation for this perhaps puzzling divergence. The comparison of the actual caseload to the steady state caseload for 1994 (0.1089 vs. 0.1179) suggests that substantial upward momentum was left in the system. Thus, even though the declining flow rates would suggest that fewer people were entering and fewer people were continuing on the caseload, it appears that momentum (i.e., the last term of Eq. (4)) was sufficient to cause the caseload to increase.
This divergence between the direction of change in the aggregate caseload and the direction of change in the underlying flows has disturbing implications for conventional, static analyses of the caseload. If one were to monitor the actual caseload to try to determine why it declined, one would be led to examine what had changed in 1995 in California. However, if one were to monitor the flows, one would look in 1993, 2 years earlier. Because most researchers who have examined recent declines in the welfare caseload have been monitoring stocks, it is possible that they are looking too late for the true causes (see Blank, 2002) . Table 2 presents steady state calculations for all three empirical models: the 2-state model just analyzed, the 25-state model that allows for duration dependence in welfare use, and the 49-state model that allows for duration dependence in welfare use and returning to welfare. We calculate the steady states by computing the eigenvector (appropriately normalized) associated with the eigenvalue equal to 1. 8 Rather than presenting the entire distribution across all of the states (on aid for one period, on aid for two periods, etc.), we simply report the steady state share of individuals on aid in each year for the three models.
Comparing the results from the three models
The variation in the steady state caseloads across the three models is striking. The magnitude of the swings in the steady state share on aid grows as we enrich the specification of the state-space. At the steady state peak in 1993, the implied share of the population on welfare grows from 12.2% in the 2-state model, to 13.2% in the 25-state model, and to 14.8% in the 49-state model. Similarly, for 1999, the steady state share on aid falls from 4.5% in the 2-state model, to 4.0% in the 25-state model, and to 3.2% in the 49-state model.
Because the larger state models nest the smaller state models, the results based on the larger state models are the preferred estimates. For example, the 2-state model is the 25-state model with the restriction that the continuation rates are constant across the 24 
where the superscript Qs denotes quantities for the Q-state model. The weights are the distribution of individuals across the on-aid states. This equation demonstrates that, even if the 25-state continuation rates were constant, the steady state caseload computed from the two-state model would change whenever the weights change. Since the weights are the shares of the population in each state, they will change whenever the population is out of steady state (as it almost always is). In other words, even if the 25-state transition rates were constant and the caseload was converging to its steady state, the 2-state transition rates will not be constant until the true 25-state process was itself in steady state. Thus, the 2-state model would not return the appropriate steady state caseload (until the caseload was already in its steady state) if the 25-state model were the true model. The larger swing in the steady states computed with the 25-and 49-state models is caused by the systematic change in the weights. Fig. 4 plots the difference between the steady state and actual distribution of the caseload by length of time on aid for 1993 (the year with the largest implied steady state caseload) and 1999 (the year with the smallest implied steady state caseload). In 1993, the actual distribution was weighted more towards short-term spells, who tend to have lower continuation rates (see Fig. 2) . Thus, the 2-state continuation rate would tend to be lower than the 2-state continuation rate in steady state. This lower 2-state continuation rate implies that the computed 2-state steady state would be lower than the 25-state steady state, exactly consistent with the findings in Table 2 . The situation is reversed in 1999: the observed distribution has more long-term recipients than the implied steady state distribution, so the composite continuation rate is higher than the composite continuation rate implied by the 25-state steady state distribution. Thus, the estimated 2-state steady state should be higher than the 25-state steady state, again consistent with the findings in Table 2 . A similar analysis can explain the divergence (and higher amplitude) in the faction of the caseload on welfare implied by the 25-state model and the 49-state model, where the observed distribution between entry and re-entry differs from the steady state distribution.
This analysis has important implications for understanding the changing caseload. Our results suggest that there is a substantial amount of momentum in the welfare caseload. Based on our preferred results for the 49-state model, the welfare caseload would decline by over 50% from its 1999 caseload level if the 1999 entry, continuation, and re-entry rates were to persist indefinitely (0.0322 vs. 0.0689). Similarly, if the 1993 flow rates were to persist indefinitely, the caseload would have increased by 35% more than the actual 1995 peak (0.1482 vs. 0.1095).
Rates of convergence: calculating half-lives
Although steady states provide a useful description of the long-term implications of current transition rates, these long-term implications might be viewed as irrelevant if the convergence towards the steady state were sufficiently slow. Moreover, the rate of convergence will also be directly informative regarding the length of time one must wait to see the impact of a policy reflected in the total caseload.
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As noted in Section 2, rates of convergence of a Markov process towards its steady state can be characterized by the eigenvalues of the Markov matrix. However, this characterization is difficult to interpret. Fortunately, the speed of convergence can be described using a more easily interpreted metric.
10 A standard result regarding Markov processes is that they converge toward their steady state at a geometric rate (see part (c) of 9 As should be clear, such an analysis only applies to policies that restrict the underlying flows. Certain policies would have an immediate impact. For example, if the welfare program was cancelled, the impact of the policy change would be immediately observed as a substantial and immediate decline in the welfare rolls. 10 We are aware that half-lives are commonly used to describe exponential decay and that exponential and geometric decay are closely related. However, we are unaware of previous studies that have calculated half-lives in the context of Markov Chain models to describe the rate of convergence. Cinlar's theorem). In addition, it is straightforward to show that geometric convergence has a half-life that can be calculated as,
where b is the rate of geometric decay. 11 In other words, from any initial distribution, a half-life of h months implies that the system moves half the distance towards its new steady state in h months, half of the remaining distance in 2h months (i.e., 75%), and then half of the remaining distance in 3h months (i.e., 87.5%). A relatively long half-life would imply that it would take a long time for a change in transition rates to be reflected in the aggregate caseload.
The results of Section 2 imply that the rate of geometric decay for a two-state model is given by the second eigenvalue. Standard results for Markov processes suggest that the second eigenvalue for the two-state model is given by k 2 = c À e.
12 Combining this expression with Eq. (9) implies that the half-life for the two-state model can be computed as follows,
Assuming that the continuation rate is greater than the entry rate (as is overwhelmingly true in our data), the half-life is increasing in the continuation rate and decreasing in the entry rate. The intuitive explanation for Eq. (10) is straightforward. Consider two Markov processes that describe the welfare caseload, where the first process has a larger continuation rate than the second. Furthermore, suppose that both processes were out of steady state because more people were on aid than was implied by the steady state; for example, suppose that a policy was enacted that lowered the entry rate. The first process will have a relatively longer half-life because the cohorts that entered aid under the earlier regime (with a higher entry rate) will remain on aid longer because of the larger continuation rate. Thus, the cohorts that entered under the old regime will not be replaced as quickly. A similar argument can be made for differences in the entry rate.
We present the half-lives for the two-state model in Table 3 . Over the period 1989-1999, the half-life ranges between 16 and 22 months for each observed combination of entry and continuation rates. Thus, it would take about 18 months for half the impact of a 11 Suppose that a particular quantity A(t) is decaying geometrically towards 0 with each time period t, i.e., A(t) = b t A(0), b is the rate of decay (between 0 and 1 in absolute value), and A(0) is the initial value. The distance between A(t) and 0 is given by |A(t)| = |b| t |A(0)|. If this process has a proper half-life, then there must exist a constant time period h for A(t) to traverse half the remaining distance towards 0; or, letting N be the number of half-lives, then 0.5 N |A(0)| = |b| hN |A(0)| should be solvable with h being independent of N and A(0). It is straightforward to show that this is the case, with Eq. (9) being the result. 12 We obtain this expression by relying on two results: that the sum of the eigenvalues equals the trace of the Markov matrix (see Eq. (2)) and that the largest eigenvalue is equal to 1 for a Markov matrix. Furthermore, we note that if the continuation rate and the entry rate are equal, then Eq. (10) is undefined and the methods we describe are not applicable. change in the underlying flows (to the levels in the particular year) to be observed in the aggregate caseload, and 36 months for 75% of the eventual impact to be observed.
Based on simulations, Table 4 reports the half-lives for the three different models in each year. Once again, expanding the state-space impacts the computations, usually increasing the implied half-life. And once again, the disparity in results can be understood by the implicit distributions that are used to calculate composite continuation and entry rates. For example, the composite continuation rate in the latter years tends to be too high because the caseload is weighted towards long-term recipients relative to the steady state weights; long-term recipients have higher continuation rates (see Fig. 3 ) and higher continuation rates are associated with longer half-lives (see Eq. (10)). Due to the same nesting argument made in the previous section, our preferred results are those based on the 49-state model. These half-life results have important implications for evaluating the impact of anything that changes the caseload through the underlying flows. Our results imply that any change in the flows will only slowly affect the aggregate caseload, with the half-life being at least 2 years. Conventional models of the aggregate caseload that use a difference-in-difference identification strategy implicitly assume that the entire effect of a policy is observed immediately (e.g., CEA, 1997 CEA, , 1999 . Thus, such models will likely underestimate the true impact of the policy or any other predictor of the caseload change. A corollary to this point is that the caseload might be changing in one period because of events that happened in previous periods. For example, the continued caseload decline that has been observed during the late 1990s could be due to changes in the mid-1990s.
The relative importance of entry, continuation, and re-entry
Understanding the relative role of the various transition rates can be important for many reasons. First, the relative contribution of changes in the flow rates will have important implications for how caseload changes should be studied. For example, most randomized trials of welfare programs have estimated the effect of programs on current welfare recipients. To the extent that changes in entry are relatively important, then such randomized trials will be less useful to understanding general caseload changes (Moffitt, 1991; Grogger et al., 2002) . Second, reductions in entry may also have implications for the provision of in-kind transfers. If families primarily learn about programs such as Food Stamps or Medicaid when they first apply for welfare, then reduced entry could affect the take-up of these other programs. Third, the relative role can provide evidence regarding the potential cause of underlying changes. For example, policies that provide services to those on aid (e.g., training or job search assistance) will have their direct effect on continuation rates. 13 Alternatively, policies that more stringently monitor eligibility would impact the caseload primarily through the entry rate.
Analyzing the relative contributions of the underlying flows is not straightforward, however, because of the sluggish adjustment of the caseload. For example, consider again the actual caseload change from 1993 to 1994 in Table 1 . Despite the fact that the entry and continuation rates are declining, the actual caseload is increasing during this interval. If we were to focus on the actual caseload changes for such a subperiod, we would 13 An indirect effect on entry is also possible (Moffitt, 1991) . People might be more likely to come onto welfare because they know that welfare makes them eligible for training; or, conversely, people might be less likely to come onto welfare because they know that they will be required to search for a job.
conclude that the contribution of entry and continuation to the caseload increase is negative, an unappealing conclusion.
To avoid such problems, we examine the importance of entry and continuation for changes in the steady state caseload. Specifically, we compute the entry rate, continuation rate, and steady state for 2 years of interest. Then, we simulate the steady state caseload under the counterfactual assumption that only one of the flows changed. For example, we define the change in the fraction of the caseload on aid due to the entry rate Ds*(De) as,
where the denominator is the total change in steady state between the first set of rates (e 1 ,c 1 ) and the second set of rates (e 2 ,c 2 ) and the numerator is the implied change in the steady state allowing only the entry rate to change. For this calculation, we consider year 1 to be the base year. We compute the impact of changing the continuation rate analogously.
It should be noted that these decompositions are highly nonlinear, and thus the percentage of the caseload change attributed to entry and continuation need not add to 100%. Moreover, when assessing the change between 2 years, it will generally matter which year was assigned the role of the base year. Because there is not a correct method to assigning the base year, we calculate results using both years as the base year.
14 Table 4 reports the results of these calculations for two time periods: the period of increasing flow rates (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) and the period of decreasing flow rates (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . We present results using all three models and using each of the years as the base year. For the 25-and 49-state models, we change the continuation and/or re-entry rates at every duration simultaneously.
From Table 4 , it is clear that the individual contributions of the rates do not add to 100% and that the value of the contributions vary with the chosen base year. However, the estimates tell a consistent story: changes in the entry rate are more important than changes in the continuation rates. For the period of the caseload increase, the estimated contribution of changes in the entry rate is consistently 50% larger than the estimated contribution of changes in the continuation rate. Changes in the re-entry rate have little impact. The relative role of changes in the entry rate is not as great when examining the caseload decline, but it is always greater than the role of changes in the continuation rate.
Similar results have been reported in several other studies. Using methods that do not exploit the steady state of the system, Grogger et al. (2003) find that changes in entry are an important part of the 1990s caseload decline using the same California administrative data and the national survey data form the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Gittleman (2001) , using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and methods similar to Grogger, Haider, and Klerman, studies welfare caseload changes during the 1980s and early 1990s and also finds a large role for entry.
Conclusions and discussion
Using standard results for Markov Chain models, this paper examined the dynamic properties of the welfare caseload. This exercise yields several empirical findings with important implications for the study of welfare policy.
Our first two findings are closely related. First, we find that there is considerable momentum in the welfare caseload. The California caseload would have increased substantially more (by 35% when compared to the actual caseload peak) if the flows of 1993 had persisted and the caseload would decline substantially more (by 50% when compared to its 1999 level) if the flows of 1999 were to persist. Our second finding is that the caseload only changes sluggishly. Given the flow rates that were observed during the 1990s in California, the implicit half-life of the welfare caseload is always more than 2 years (our preferred results from the 49-state model).
Many previous studies have pointed to caseload dynamics as being important in interpreting econometric studies of welfare caseload changes (see Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Bell, 2001; Blank, 2002; Klerman and Haider, in press ). This study provides explicit methods for characterizing these dynamics. Our findings of sluggish adjustment cast doubt on the conventional difference-in-difference identification strategy used in studies such as CEA (1999) that implicitly assume that all of the effect of a policy is observed immediately (i.e., between the two periods in which the policy changes). Rather, the relatively long half-life implies that an evaluation of any policy that operates through the flows must wait at least 2 years to see even half of the policy's impact being reflected in the caseload levels.
15 Similarly, if the flows observed in 1999 were to persist indefinitely, it should be expected that the caseload would decline by another 50% because of the downward pressure that already exists.
Our third finding is that the dynamic properties are very sensitive to the specification of the state-space. Computations from simple, two-state models that have been previously used differ dramatically when compared to computations from richer and more realistic models. Since the two-state models are nested in the larger state models, we conclude that those using Markov Chain models need to consider models with duration dependence. This finding implies significant advantages to more detailed data on welfare duration. Unfortunately, such data are often not available.
Finally, we find that a large proportion of the caseload level change is due to changes in the entry rate. Thus, many of the recent studies of welfare reform that track families as they move off of the caseload (so-called bleaverQ studies) or perform randomized trials on individuals already on welfare (see Grogger et al., 2002 for a useful summary) ignore many of the people who are affected by welfare reform-those who never enter. Moreover, to the extent that information about other social programs (Food Stamps and Medicaid) is obtained during the welfare application process, the take-up of these other programs could also decline. Finally, this finding could have implications for understanding the causes of the observed caseload decline: whatever was the underlying cause must operate through the changing entry rate.
